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Through the lens of the French law prohibiting Muslim headscarves in
schools, this article examines the way in which societal tensions that arise in
the context of religious and cultural pluralism are translated into legal dis-
courses relating to human rights and equality. It explores the way in which the
law is rooted in France’s broader sociopolitical structure and history and
contrasts it to the United Kingdom and Turkey. It proposes that the law is
based on an anachronistic, formal interpretation of equality that is inappro-
priate for addressing the inevitable cultural diversity of modern French so-
ciety, and through its permeation into law and policymaking more widely, it is
a primary cause of the heightened social tensions involving the Muslim mi-
nority. An assessment of the legitimacy of a law that restricts minority groups’
cultural practices in this way in any society should be based on a substantive
interpretation of equality and should necessarily involve an active endeavor to
understand the meanings of those cultural practices for those groups within
their distinct context. Upon this foundation, law and policy can be developed
in a way that better reconciles the pluralism of modern society with the com-
mon objectives of social harmony, stability, and tolerance.
Article L. 141–51 of the French Education Code provides:
‘‘In state primary and secondary schools, the wearing of signs or
dress by which pupils overtly manifest a religious affiliation is
prohibited.’’ (Legislation passed on March 15, 2004)
The headscarf is a visible marker of the identity of Islam. As such, it
is frequently presented as a symbol of both the controversies cur-
rently surrounding the religion in domestic and international
affairs, and of the wider tensions relating to the multicultural na-
ture of modern European societies. To question the legitimacy of
the law banning headscarves in French schools is to open Pandora’s
box, revealing jumbled interrelationships and tensions between
notions of equality, human rights, and the social and political the-
ories that surround and inform them. There is disagreement on
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the matter between cultural relativists and universalists, liberals
and communitarians, those on the left and on the right, those with
‘‘Western’’ and ‘‘non-Western’’ perspectives, and proponents of
different branches of feminism. Most would unite in desiring an
end result that reflects and supports a harmonious society that
values equality. Yet most differ in how they envision the nature of
that equality in a multicultural context, and the most appropriate
means to achieve it.
In this article I explore ways in which the headscarf issue is
invoked to characterize differentiated visions of equality. I examine
the formal interpretation of equality which underpins this law and
which is characteristic of the French administration’s approach to
minority groups more generally, and map this onto France’s
distinct sociopolitical structure and history. I contrast the French
approach with the approaches of the United Kingdom and Turkey.
I propose that, in a modern world characterized by cultural
diversity, the legitimacy of any law affecting cultural practices
depends on its consistency with a substantive vision of equality.
Assessing the legitimacy of such a law consequently requires an
active endeavor to understand the meaning and importance of
those cultural practices for those affected within their particular
context, in order to understand whether or not it ultimately
imposes unfair disadvantage. This endeavor is particularly im-
portant in situations where such a law appears to target a minority
group that is already experiencing widespread discrimination. On
this basis, I argue that the French law is actively hindering French
society in its efforts to improve integration and equality.
The French Law: Context and Constitutional Roots
The French legislation effecting a ban on headscarves is unique
within the EU and has provoked controversy both domestically and
internationally. On its face, the law imposes a prohibition on all
overt religious symbols. The common tendency to refer to it as ‘‘the
headscarf ban,’’ however, demonstrates that this is widely under-
stood as the government’s primary intention. This understanding
derives from a coalescence of factors including the events and dis-
cussions immediately preceding it, the broader social context of
Muslims in France, the impact of the ban, and France’s colonial and
constitutional history.
The law is an amendment to the part of the French Code of
Education that concerns the constitutional principle of laı̈cité, or
secularity. The roots of this principle go back to the French Rev-
olution in 1789, when the French people sought to overthrow the
entire system of hierarchical, undemocratic power that included
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the Roman Catholic Church. Separation of church and state was
for a long time only partial; it was not until 1905 that total sec-
ularism was imposed, and any state recognition, funding, or en-
dorsement of any religious groups was prohibited; the Code of
Education was accordingly amended to impose a prohibition on
endorsement of any religion in state schools. This did not in prac-
tice lead to any restriction on religious dress; school administrators
tolerated schoolchildren wearing a range of symbols from Chris-
tian crosses to Jewish kippahs, and no controversy over the matter
arose for almost a century.
France enjoyed a sustained economic boom post-World War II.
In an effort to fill the new array of available jobs, it encouraged a
wave of immigration, primarily from Islamic North African coun-
tries, such as Algeria, which were former colonies. By the early
1980s, the Muslim population in France had risen to approxi-
mately 5 million (9–10 percent of the total population),1 the largest
in Europe, making Islam the second biggest religion in France
after Roman Catholicism. These immigrants were hardest hit when
the economic boom came to its abrupt end. Finding themselves
unemployed, many were pushed out en masse to live in housing
estates (cités HLM) in the suburbs of the big French towns, where
they became spatially segregated. Tension quickly mounted be-
tween Muslims and non-Muslims over this socioeconomic disparity.
As a visible symbol of the difference between the two groups, the
headscarf was seized upon as a factor in the tensions and escalated
into a politically charged topic of debate. Passions in the media
reached boiling point following the 1989 ‘‘headscarf affair’’ (affaire
du foulard), when two schoolgirls were expelled for wearing their
headscarves.
The Minister of Education sought advice from the Constitu-
tional Council (Conseil) as to whether or not school administrators
should be able to expel students for wearing religious symbols in
view of the laı̈cité principle. The Conseil took the view that not only
was the right to wear headscarves compatible with the laı̈cité prin-
ciple, but it was legally constitutive of citizens’ fundamental rights
to exercise their freedom of expression and religion. It qualified
this view somewhat by stating that the wearing of such symbols
should not be ‘‘ostentatious or provocative’’ in a way that would
constitute an act of proselytism or propaganda, or disrupt order in
a school (Conseil d’Etat 1989). Grasping hold of this element of the
analysis, the minister issued a nonbinding circular advising that
‘‘ostentatious or provocative’’ symbols should not be worn
in schools. However, the Conseil proved unwilling to alter its
1 Even this approximation is disputed, the imprecision of the figure being largely due
to the fact that France does not ask for a person’s religion in its census.
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interpretation of the law; in a judgment in November 1992, it
found against a school that had imposed a rule prohibiting relig-
ious signs. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs, President François
Mitterand set up a High Commission on Integration in 1993,
which, in its first report, set out the philosophy underlying the
government’s attitude to cultural diversity resulting from immi-
gration. The following extract represents the heart of the report:
The French conception of integration should obey a logic of
equality and not a logic of minorities. The principles of identity
and equality which go back to the Revolution and the declaration
of the rights of Man impregnate our conception, thus founded on
equality of individuals before the law, whatever their origin, race
or religion . . . to the exclusion of an institutional recognition of
minorities (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 1996:35).
This interpretation of ‘‘equality’’ as a concept that logically ex-
cludes minorities clearly underpins the increasing orientation of
successive French governments toward cultural assimilation of im-
migrants and their offspring. It manifests a conviction that a com-
mon republican identity must take precedence over any divergent
aspect of an individual’s identity that is religious, ethnic, or lin-
guistic. It is this interpretation of equality as cultural ‘‘sameness’’
that underlies the French government’s desire to ban the wearing
of headscarves.
Tensions continued to increase through the 1990s, and incidents
of ethnicity-related violence began to occur in the suburbs. Statistics
suggested that this was primarily caused by North African Muslims’
continued economic and spatial exclusion. In 2002, then–Interior
Minister Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to demonstrate solidarity with
Muslims by permitting a Muslim Council to formally represent
Muslim views. But this gesture did not solve the prevailing prob-
lems; in 2003, unemployment rates among French North African
immigrants were still four to five times the national average (which
was already close to 10 percent), and 50 to 80 percent of France’s
prison population was Muslim (Khosrokhavar 2004). Despite the
size of its Muslim population, France had very few large-scale
mosques. There was not (and there still is not) a single Muslim
representative in the French National Assembly. Despite such sta-
tistics, the government did not accept the existence of institutional
discrimination against Muslims. Instead, it continued to attribute the
tensions to the presence of religious symbols (and particularly Mus-
lim headscarves) in schools, in effect judging the key social problem
to be Muslims’ non-acceptance of ‘‘Frenchness.’’
In July 2003, President Jacques Chirac set up the Stasi Com-
mission to produce a report on the application of the laı̈cité prin-
ciple, which recommended the passing of a law prohibiting
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religious symbols. It reasoned that the foundational purpose of
state schools in France was to assure ‘‘autonomy’’ and ‘‘openness to
cultural diversity,’’ and that this presupposed fixed common rules
such as gender equality and secularity. It argued that the headscarf
did not fit with this vision, portraying it as contrary to the principle
of gender equality. It was not an entirely one-sided report; some
counterarguments were raised in support of girls’ freedom to wear
the headscarf, but they were given far less emphasis. The govern-
ment quickly acted on the recommendation. Upon the announce-
ment of the new law, street marches took place in Paris and
elsewhere in France, and many more protests were staged inter-
nationally (Loi no 2004–228). Although most students complied
and removed their religious garments, approximately 50 expul-
sions resulted that year from students’ refusal to remove head-
scarves, and a number took up distance learning or moved to
private education in religious schools.
Since 2004, clashes involving France’s Muslim population have
increased. This came to the attention of the international community
in October 2005, when a series of riots and violent incidents began in
the suburbs and spread to cités throughout the country, causing panic
within the government. The roots of this and other such events can
undoubtedly be traced to the continuing low socioeconomic status of
ethnic minorities who remain segregated in the suburbs. A recent
report from the French think tank Institut Montaigne talks of the
situation in such terms as ‘‘rampant ethnic segregation’’ of North
African Muslims in ‘‘ghettos,’’ and attributes it directly to the coun-
try’s refusal to ‘‘recognize itself as a pluri-ethnic nation’’ and to face
up to ‘‘the reality of minorities’’ (Sabeg & Méhaignerie 2004).
Echoes of French Colonialist Policy and Jacobin
Republicanism
The French notion of ‘‘integration,’’ as suggested above, is best
characterized as one of assimilation: the obliteration of any ‘‘mi-
nority’’ identity in favor of ‘‘Frenchness,’’ with the objective of
achieving a sense of equality through cultural similarity. As Roy has
suggested, there is officially no ‘‘Muslim community’’ in France at
all; Muslims who identify themselves as members of an ethnic, re-
ligious, or cultural minority are best described in French terms as
‘‘casualties of the integration process’’ (Roy 2004). This preference
for assimilation over integration is far more deep-rooted than the
debates of the 1980s and 1990s; its roots can be found in the ap-
proach of the French authorities toward its colonies.
A primary justification used by the French in the nineteenth cen-
tury for extending their colonial reach was the idea of a ‘‘mission to
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civilize’’ (mission civilisatrice), whereby the spreading of French culture
abroad would have the dual benefit of enlightening the ‘‘backward’’
colonized peoples and increasing France’s international influence.
This idea arose at a time of deep disillusionment in France in the
wake of its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and was promulgated by
philosopher Charles Renouvier, who asserted that this mission would
be a way for the French to positively promote their ideals and make
the rest of the world take notice. This idea was soon adopted by
French leaders, who made it an official doctrine of the state.
Once colonial governance was established, the French admin-
istration exercised a highly centralized mode of control, particu-
larly in North African countries such as Algeria. Its policy of
cultural assimilation was a natural offshoot of the original mission
civilisatrice idea, the aim being to make the colonies an integral
part of the ‘‘mother land’’ and their citizens into model French
citizens, so that the French administration could exercise greater
and more effective control. Consequently, the Algerian people
were characterized as ‘‘Muslim French,’’ Algerian towns were in-
fused with French-style architecture, and there was a high degree
of linguistic acculturation. Notably, one of the core tactics in pur-
suing the assimilation strategy was the persuasion and coercion of
women into removing their headscarves, the idea being that if one
woman were to remove it, and thereby to become uprooted from
her culture, then the rest would follow.2
The French preference for centralization of control and abso-
lute unity of values stems from the distinctive Jacobin republican
tradition, characterized by its political idealism, egalitarianism, and
desire to extinguish opposition. Drawing from Rousseau’s theory
of a social contract arising from a general will, the Jacobins envis-
aged a nation-state model that would enshrine the equal rights and
obligations of citizens in such as way as to obviate the need for any
group identity politics based on particularized local, religious, or
racial factors. Its influence has ingrained itself in French sociopo-
litical ideology and has meant that, since the time of the Revolu-
tion, all hyphenated or localized identities have been associated
with subversion and disloyalty to the Republic, seen as destructive
of a unitary idea of French citizenship, and generally considered
contrary to the common good.
In the twentieth century, this ideology translated itself into an
immigration policy with a goal of minimizing sociocultural differ-
ence through the assimilation of immigrants into the dominant cul-
ture. Consequently, for many French politicians and commentators
2 Of course, the strategy did not ultimately breed the compliance and cultural meta-
morphosis that the French administration had hoped; the Algerians’ dissatisfaction finally
led to the war of independence, which was achieved in 1962.
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the very concept of ‘‘ethnic minorities’’ is unacceptable and is rarely
referred to in contemporary political debates. Instead, the term
immigrés is still commonly used, in reference not just to recent
immigrants but also to men and women with immigrant ancestry
who have been born and spent all their life in France. There is no
institutional recognition for ethnic origin, which is formally preclud-
ed by data protection laws; even the national census only covers two
categories: national or étranger. This makes it difficult to state with any
degree of certainty figures for ethnic minorities in France or to assess
the real impact of ethnic diversity on the French population.
The Headscarf in the United Kingdom: A Contrasting
European Approach
The United Kingdom takes a very different approach to cul-
tural diversity and is noted for its policy of ‘‘multiculturalism,’’
whereby cultural differences are supported by the state. Accord-
ingly, although 3 percent of the population is Muslim and the
headscarf is worn by many women and girls, it has never arisen as a
controversial issue; it is simply assumed to be a matter of basic
freedom of expression and religion that women and girls are able
to wear it in public life. No restrictions on its use have been con-
sidered in relation to state schools or any other public space, and a
blanket ban has never been suggested.
An aphorized expression of the difference between the two
states’ approaches to cultural diversity can be found in extracts
from their own reports to the UN Human Rights Committee on
measures they had adopted to give effect to the rights of minorities
under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR; Human Rights Committee 1986). France’s
report states that the Republic, under the terms of its constitution,
is ‘‘indivisible, secular, democratic and social. It shall ensure the
quality of all citizens before the law, without distinction . . . France is
a country in which there are no minorities.’’ The United King-
dom’s report appears almost a deliberate contradiction, stating that
‘‘integration is not seen as a flattening process of assimilation, but
as equality of opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an
atmosphere of mutual toleration.’’ (Parekh 3 Essentially, the British
approach to cultural pluralism aims to accord respect to the
3 In a similar vein, the United Kingdom’s government-commissioned report ‘‘The
Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain’’ describes its approach to multicultural policy as follows:
‘‘Citizens are not only individuals but also members of particular religious, ethnic, cultural
& regional communities . . . Britain is both a community of citizens and a community of
communities, both a liberal and a multicultural society, and needs to reconcile their some-
times conflicting requirements.’’ See Parekh 2000:Preface, pp. x–xi.
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distinctive identities of minority communities and to create the
conditions in which minorities can thrive and obtain social justice
despite their differences while interacting productively with both
the majority culture and with other minorities (Poulter 1997:47–8).
To some extent this difference in approach reflects the coun-
try’s internal composition and liberal democratic political philos-
ophy; unlike France, where the emphasis has always been on the
unity of the Republic, the United Kingdom is an assembly of na-
tions that has always allowed a looser connection to the center
through a greater degree of devolved power. Again, the historical
approach of the British to their colonies is informative. The British
Empire was based on a looser and more informal model, and the
approach to colonial control was also less centralized (Pitts 2005).
Although a certain degree of cultural indoctrination was pursued
in some British colonies such as India among the elite classes, the
ambition to ‘‘civilize’’ and to assimilate the colonized peoples was
not as strong a motivation for the British as it was for the French
administration. Rather, the Empire was intended primarily as a
trade-based infrastructure, to maximize Britain’s economic
strength and control (Ferguson 2002).
Immigration in the United Kingdom has been approached
differently from the beginning. In the 1950s, immigrants arriving
from a wide spectrum of Commonwealth countries were immedi-
ately given more rights, including the right to vote. They were
more successful in lobbying for sociocultural developments such as
the building of mosques and the introduction of halal food in
schools, which manifested a recognition of their distinct cultural
practices and identities. Britain has increasingly ensured the vis-
ibility of ethnic minorities in prominent positions in public life. An
obvious example is their strong presence as television news read-
ers, which can be contrasted to the virtually snow-white profile of
news readers in France; another example is political representa-
tion. Ultimately, the British approach has produced more social
mobility for minorities. Despite the British policy of multi-
culturalism, there is in fact less ethnic and racial segregation in
the United Kingdom than in France. The situation is far from
perfect; some towns in the north of the United Kingdom such as
Bradford are very racially divided, and riots occurred in 2001 as a
result of those divisions. However, this is the exception rather than
the rule. In London, a third of the population is now from an
ethnic minority, and although there are some ethnically defined
concentrations, the city is visibly multiracial. This can be contrasted
to Paris and indeed most of France’s big cities, where the spatial
segregation remains evident.
The multicultural social vision is not in any way limitless; it
stops far short of complete cultural relativism in its support of
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minority cultures. Lines are drawn at culturally divergent practices
such as polygamy and forced marriage, which have long been il-
legal. Although the Muslim headscarf has not provoked debate in
the United Kingdom, debates have arisen about other items of
religious dress worn by Muslim women. The terms of these debates
aptly illustrate the different points at which the United Kingdom
and France draw the line.
The jilbab (a full-length Muslim dress) became the subject of
public contention in the United Kingdom in 2005, during a court
case brought by a pupil against her school, which had forbidden
her to wear the garment on the ground that it contravened the
uniform rules (R [on the application of Begum] v. Headteacher and
Governors of Denbigh High School 2006). Ultimately, the House of
Lords decided in favor of the school, but this was only because it
found that the school had clearly acted sensitively and reasonably,
and had demonstrated a respect for the girl’s freedom of religion.
It had ensured pupils a degree of flexibility of dress by allowing
Muslim headscarves, it had put forward a good reason for requir-
ing pupils to comply with the core terms of its uniform that were
not consistent with the jilbab, and it had considered the fact that the
girl was, in the circumstances, able to move to a nearby school
where the jilbab was permitted. Notably, in none of the surround-
ing political or media discussions was there a mention of the pos-
sibility of a blanket ban.
An even more heated debate has arisen more recently in the
United Kingdom over Muslim women who wear the niqab (a face
veil with slits for the eyes).4 The matter came to the media’s at-
tention when Cabinet Minister Jack Straw asked a woman in his
constituency whether she would mind removing it when she talked
to him because he felt uncomfortable (Straw 2006). Debates raged
over whether or not this request was acceptable. The key question
at issue was whether or not women can communicate with the rest
of society effectively while wearing a face covering, particularly
when they are employed in positions such as teaching school where
interpersonal communication is paramount. There soon followed
two legal controversies over the niqab. The first concerned a class-
room assistant who was sacked for refusing to remove it.5 The
second concerned a solicitor who refused to remove it during a
trial when ordered to do so by the judge on the ground that
he could not hear her properly, and who consequently ceased
4 The debate over the niqab is not in fact directly comparable to the French situation,
as it tends only to be worn by older Muslim women, and consequently it does not raise
questions in relation to schoolgirls. However, it also serves to illustrate the distance between
the lines drawn by the United Kingdom and French authorities over issues of religious
dress.
5 This decision was upheld by an employment tribunal, but an appeal is pending.
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representing her client.6 These cases and the issues they raise have
not yet been resolved. But again, despite disagreements over the
appropriateness of the garment in these particular contexts, there
have been no proposals for a blanket ban.7
The United Kingdom’s approach to minority groups is not ex-
emplary; several of the government’s policies appear to impede in-
tegration due to the particular ways in which they give benefits to
those groups. One such policy is the increasing consultative power
given to religious organizations and their leaders. This is intended to
create a process whereby cultural values are interchanged to produce
representative multicultural policies. However, religious leaders’
views are not necessarily representative of the broader minority com-
munities; their views generally represent the most extreme end of the
spectrum in relation to issues such as the maintenance of traditions.
Moreover, this process can verge uncomfortably toward bringing re-
ligion directly into the sphere of secular politics. Another such policy
is the increasing state funding of faith schools. This explicitly classifies
and segregates people at a young age and facilitates curriculum dis-
parities that result in the teaching of differentiated social, cultural,
and political as well as religious values. In Sen’s view, the British
approach is analogous to ushering children ‘‘like sheep into pens’’
according to their religious faith (Sen 2006). This approach to mul-
ticultural policy, he argues, tends toward a kind of ‘‘plural mono-
culturalism’’ and has a damaging, divisive effect on society.
Indeed, a degree of soul-searching is taking place in the British
government and the public arena more generally about how to gen-
erate a clearer notion of citizenship in terms of values that apply to all
to bind citizens together, without imposing dominant ‘‘white’’ values
on the cultural diversity of society. Although this debate arises from a
degree of dissatisfaction in terms of cultural integration, the terms on
which it is conducted demonstrate the a priori assumption that cul-
tural diversity exists, that it will continue to exist indefinitely, and that
it needs to be considered in the process of decisionmaking on key
national policies in a sensitive manner.
The Headscarf in Turkey: A Secularist Ban in the
Muslim World
Like France, Turkey is a secular state and has legally restricted
the wearing of headscarves. However, a key difference is its
6 This decision was followed by a circular giving temporary guidance to judges in the
form of a compromise solution: a presumption that the niqab is allowed, but judicial
discretion to require its removal if to do so is in the interests of justice.
7 This, however, is being proposed in the Netherlands, and if it goes ahead, it will be
the first European country to impose a complete ban on the niqab.
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ethnographic profile as an overwhelmingly Muslim country: 96.9
percent of its population positively identify themselves as such.
Consequently there have been dramatic legal and political swings
of opinion on the headscarf matter, and public debates surround-
ing the ban have been even more tense and drawn-out than those
in France. The Turkish ban can also be differentiated from the
French ban in that it actually extends further, to universities and to
women in other public institutions.
The historical background again serves to illuminate the think-
ing behind the contemporary law. Following its war of indepen-
dence, Turkey became a republic in 1923 on the twin foundations
of modernity and secularism. Radical modernizing reforms were
immediately introduced by its first president, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, including the abolition of Islamic law in favor of a secular
legal system. Religious dress was targeted early on with the Hat
Law (1925) and the Law Relating to Prohibited Garments (1934).
These laws, however, were not strictly enforced in practice.
In the 1970s and 1980s, politics began to bifurcate between
parties who sought a relaxation of the secularist policies and more
militant secularists, and the headscarf was used as a symbol in that
divide. There followed a series of clashes between the various arms
of the state on the matter. The existing dress regulations were
extended to apply to students (Regulation Concerning the Dress of
Students and Staff in Schools 1981: Art. 6), and a mandatory pun-
ishment was imposed for students who did not comply (Disciplin-
ary Regulation for Students in Higher Education 1985).
Universities were reluctant to implement the changes, and in
1987, the government sought to pass a law to exempt them, but
this was vetoed by the President.8 A further attempt in 1989 was
annulled by the Constitutional Court on the ground that it
breached the principle of secularism and thus threatened the
‘‘unity of the state’’ and ‘‘public order’’ (Judgment No. 1989/12). In
a more assertive endeavor, in 1990, the government managed to
pass a law to allow the headscarf in universities, ‘‘provided that it is
not forbidden by law’’ (Law 3670 1990), but the Constitutional
Court went on in its judgments to declare that current laws of sex
equality did indeed forbid it (Judgment No. 1991/8). In the wake of
this confusion, universities continued to be inconsistent in their
application of the headscarf ban. But in February 1997, the Turkish
military issued an ultimatum to the government, in what has been
called a postmodern coup d’état, demanding that the civilian au-
thorities implement the ban without exception.
8 The president of the time was Kenan Evren, and the office of president had recently
increased in power with the new Constitution of 1982, giving him powers to veto such
proposals.
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Since then, the ban has been far more widely enforced. State
officials have prevented women with headscarves from registering
for educational and driving courses, and they have suspended ac-
ademics who either refuse to comply with it or who publicly crit-
icize it. The ban has even touched the private sphere, which should
in theory be beyond its scope: in February 2006, the Constitutional
Court ruled in favor of a decision to revoke the promotion of a
nursery school teacher on the grounds that she regularly wore a
headscarf outside of school, on her journey to and from work, and
in the same month it upheld a decision to reject the application of a
religious education teacher who had been refused a public position
because his wife wore a headscarf (Human Rights Watch 2004).
Concurrently, however, some women with public profiles as high
as that of Emine Erdogan, the prime minister’s wife, dis-align
themselves with such moves by continuing to wear headscarves in
public.
The issue was brought to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) in 2005, in the case of Leyla Rahin, a university
student who was forbidden to sit her exams because of her head-
scarf (Leyla Rahin v. Turkey 2005). The court upheld the ban on the
ground that Turkey’s political concerns legitimated the interfer-
ence with her freedom of religion. Key concerns include the pos-
sibility that an Islamic political party may rise in popularity and
move to create a fully Islamic state. This tension was evidenced in
the Welfare Party Case (Refah Party v. Turkey) (2003), in which the
Turkish government was challenged in the ECHR over the ban it
imposed on an Islamic extremist party whose political aims, if
elected, included the implementation of traditional Shariah law,
and even a renunciation of the very democratic process by which it
would have come to power. Another clear concern is that Turkey is
seeking to demonstrate it is serious about reducing the systemic
oppression of women in its society in order to further its bid to join
the EU, and the headscarf can be used as a symbolic means of
demonstrating a commitment to gender equality.
However, the reasonableness of the Turkish state’s professed
concerns is questionable. First, it is an oversimplification to argue
that the headscarf is an indicator of a polarizing opposition be-
tween Islamists threatening a reversion to Islamic law and reason-
able secularists seeking to retain a secular democracy and legal
system. As Göle has pointed out, the modern trend of veiling in
Turkey may well have emerged for reasons quite distinct from
veiling in traditional Turkey, but it is by no means a flag of religious
fundamentalism (Göle 1996). Statistics support this; 77.3 percent of
the population favor the secular republic despite positively iden-
tifying themselves as Muslims, and 77 percent of households
in Turkey include at least one woman who wears some form of
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headscarf (Human Rights Watch 2004). Second, it is misleading to
posit the headscarf as a garment inherently opposed to gender
equality and to use this assertion as a political tool to gain Europe-
friendly credentials, when the gender equality implications of the
headscarf are far from straightforward, and when the real reason
that Turkey is failing to meet human rights standards in terms of
the oppression of women is the continued existence of practices
such as honor killings in the country, which are clearly far more
pressing and are self-evidently discriminatory.
Interestingly, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has declared
itself to be far less certain than the ECHR on the issue of whether
the ban is valid and whether the above political concerns justify the
restriction. In discussing the matter in its most recent report about
Turkey, it expressed concern that the ban has resulted in discrim-
ination against female students wearing headscarves, particularly
in restricting their access to education, and it recommended that
Turkey consider carefully the effects of the ban and put forward a
solution on the matter by 2009 (CEDAW 2005).
In any event, although the ECHR ultimately validated Turkey’s
concerns, it emphasized that the legitimacy of a ban in terms of
human rights was highly context-specific. This clearly left the door
wide open for a different judgment in different sociopolitical cir-
cumstances, and many commentators have interpreted this an im-
plied reference to the ban in France.9 Paradoxically, the fact that
the majority in France are not Muslim may make its ban even less
legitimate. In France, Muslims form a minority group that is al-
ready experiencing social exclusion and disproportionate poverty
of a kind that indicates the presence of discrimination, and con-
sequently a ban enacted in this context will be seen as only adding
to that. There is arguably an important difference between a law
that results from a political consensus within the majority ethnic
group in determining the treatment of a minority group, and a
policy that results from a political consensus within the majority
group in determining the treatment of that same majority. A head-
scarf ban in the latter case inevitably has a greater degree of dem-
ocratic legitimacy than the former, albeit the question of exactly
9 See paragraph 115 of the Rahin judgment: ‘‘[a]s the Turkish courts state . . . this
religious symbol has taken on political significance in Turkey in recent years . . . . The
Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political movements in Turkey
which seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and conception of a
society founded on religious precepts.’’ Also see paragraph 136: ‘‘[i]t is of crucial impor-
tance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights
practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. Moreover, the Convention is a living
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’’ (Leyla Rahin v.
Turkey 2005).
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how much weight should be given to a minority rights claim in any
particular circumstance is a complex one.
Models of Multiculturalism
It is evident from the above portraits of France, the United
Kingdom, and Turkey that a state’s decision as to law and policy on
a matter of this kind generally reflects the deeper, underlying
model of integration that the particular state employs to deal with
cultural diversity. Indeed, the way in which a state guides (or even
mandates) its schools to deal with cultural diversity is often a fairly
accurate microcosm of that model.
Globally, there is a wide spectrum between pluralist and as-
similationist models (Kallen 2003:167–78). At the pluralist end is
the Canadian ‘‘mosaic’’ model, according to which cultural differ-
ences of minority groups are recognized and actively supported by
the state. Designed to achieve ‘‘unity in heterogeneity,’’ it empha-
sizes the preservation of cultural distinctiveness. The Canadian
state has gone so far as to recognize it as a fundamental charac-
teristic of its heritage, by passing the Canadian Multiculturalism Act
(1988). The United Kingdom’s model comes fairly close to this. In
the middle of the range are models such as the United States’
‘‘melting pot’’ model, where the cultural differences are amalgam-
ated but not suppressed. The U.S. model works on the assumption
that minorities are willing and able to abandon their distinctive
characteristics (in order to ‘‘melt’’), and it provides for equal rec-
ognition of political rights, but not group cultural rights. At the
other end, there is the assimilationist model, epitomized by France,
where cultural differences are explicitly disapproved by the state
and relegated to the private sphere, so that ‘‘integration’’ takes
place by absorption or coerced suppression. Indeed, France is
considered to have one of the most assimilationist models of all
Western countries, in that immigrants and their descendants are
expected not only to conform as far as possible to traditional
‘‘French’’ values and social norms, but to avoid defining themselves
as minorities at all.
There are two major justifications for pursuing an assimila-
tionist integration model in contemporary democratic societies,
both of which appeal to equality. One is the proposition that an
emphasis on diversity and difference is prone to cause social frag-
mentation and create unrest. Indeed, the word multiculturalism has
become a somewhat loaded term, due to its association with such
concerns. Some who take this view see distinct immigrant com-
munities as simply incompatible with the society surrounding
them, which is defined by the majority culture; according to this
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view, to pander to culturally divergent views would lead to infinite
relativism and rupture the existing moral fabric of society. Others
see the members of distinct immigrant communities as inherently
unstable, divided characters with ‘‘split personalities’’ resulting
from their bicultural influences and conclude that they need to be
‘‘brought into line’’ with the cultural norm in order to integrate in
an orderly way.10 Either way, the French law is clearly a manifes-
tation of a broader concern about social fragmentation and an at-
tempt to improve social harmony by engineering an equality of
sameness. As a justification, this depends on a presumption that
cultural identity (at least, cultural identity divergent from the ma-
jority norm) is unimportant.
Another proposed justification for an assimilationist policy is
that it is in minorities’ own benefit to swallow the bitter pill of
cultural adaptation in order to succeed in the society they are living
in, so that they can achieve socioeconomic equality. According to this
view, whatever the merits of an ideal of cultural pluralism, the
practical reality is that minority groups are really just shooting
themselves in the foot if they insist on retaining their distinctive
cultural practices, because the powerful in society will inevitably
regard them with incomprehension or suspicion and will conse-
quently restrict their progression up the socioeconomic scale, pre-
venting them from breaking free from existing cycles of
disadvantage and discrimination (Poulter 1997:47). ‘‘Integration
as assimilation’’ could therefore, according to these views, prevent
such economic problems from escalating; in fact, it could ultimately
increase socioeconomic equality between minority groups and the
majority. However, the current socioeconomic position of the mi-
nority Muslim community in France, relative to the majority, can
hardly be said to support this thesis.
Equality, Discrimination Law, and Affirmative Action
The nature of a state’s integration model has a direct impact on
the nature of the laws and policies it implements concerning dis-
crimination. In an assimilationist state such as France, where the very
existence of minority groups is denied, anti-discrimination law is
logically defunct; minority groups simply do not exist to be discrim-
inated against. Consequently, France is notoriously passive in its ap-
proach to race discrimination law, and affirmative action measures
to redress situations of existing inequality are inconceivable.
10 As Ahmed puts it, ‘‘It should not be concluded that biculturalism in a colonised
subject necessarily entails the internalisation of a sense of superiority of the colonizer’s
culture or that it necessarily results in an unstable, divided sense of self ’’ (1992:207).
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Consequently, even when indisputable instances of discriminatory
practices are uncovered in France, they are dismissed as aberrations.
This is not to say that France is in any way averse to the concept
of equality; however, it pursues a ‘‘formal’’ interpretation of the
concept, rather than a ‘‘substantive’’ one, in dealing with ethnic
and cultural pluralism. Formal equality translates into an anti-clas-
sification approach to laws, policies, and selection processes where-
by like cases are treated alike and no difference except merit, or
other ‘‘rational’’ criteria, are taken into account in decisionmaking.
It is distinct from substantive equality, which translates into an anti-
subordination approach to laws, policies, and selection processes
whereby differential treatment may sometimes be required, if it
becomes clear that a meritocratic approach has in fact perpetuated
the disadvantage of a particular group (Fredman 1997). This char-
acterizes the Canadian model of integration and to a certain extent
the British model.
The tide of current thinking about equality suggests that a
formal, ostensibly neutral approach has consistently failed to re-
dress existing inequalities and that it tends instead to reproduce
existing structures of domination in society. The reason is that in-
terpreting ‘‘equal treatment’’ is often a contestable process, being
dependent on the categorization of the individual or group that is
to be treated equally, and on the chosen comparator. For example,
a family of Gypsies living in a trailer who are evicted by a local
governmental authority from a public area could be compared ei-
ther to any other family who decided to live illegally on public land,
or to other minority travelling communities who have particular
vulnerabilities and different lifestyle needs that warrant special
consideration. A gay couple seeking marriage could be compared
either to other couples seeking marriage, or to heterosexual cou-
ples for whom marriage has traditionally been a foundation for the
natural conception of children. As Bourdieu (1977) has pointed out
in his analysis of social domination in the field of law, legislators and
lawyers, who tend themselves to come from the most dominant
social groups, will be prone to develop and interpret the law (for
instance, in their choice of comparator in a discrimination case) to
further their own groups’ interests, rather than focusing on the
interests of disadvantaged minority groups.
This appears to be the outcome in France, as the social reality
for a large proportion of ethnic minorities in France (particularly
those of North African origin) is marginalization in the econom-
ically deprived suburbs. Despite repeated studies revealing wide-
spread discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and religion in
the country, few people actually seek legal redress; there is clearly a
common belief that this would be a fruitless exercise. The first
report of the antidiscrimination authority shows that only 1,800
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claims were filed in 2005, and that only 600 were followed by action
(Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2006).
A substantive conception of equality seems the only way to
avoid the tendency to perpetuate the domination of a powerful
majority group. However, there are many variations in how sub-
stantive equality itself is theorized. Some consider that equality can
only be assessed in terms of its results, and so the implementation
of ‘‘positive discrimination’’ measures, whereby minority groups
are given special treatment, are vital to produce a situation in
which minority groups are fairly treated and visibly represented
(Phillips 2004). Others are wary of special measures, either because
they lean too far toward social engineering, or because they appear
to distort the core principles of equality excessively by basing in-
dividual decisions directly on nonmeritocratic characteristics (Ab-
ram 1986). There are many different interpretations, and the
scope of this article does not permit these to be set out in any depth
here. Examples include the idea of ‘‘equality of opportunity’’‘pro-
mulgated by Rawls (1971) and the idea of ‘‘equality of respect’’
promulgated by Ronald Dworkin (1977), both of which would
support the proposition that special measures must at times be
used, but would restrict them to a minimum in order to preserve
the traditional anticlassification principles where possible. Accord-
ingly, indirect forms of ‘‘positive action,’’ whereby monitoring and
standards are imposed, would be preferred over positive discrim-
ination by way of direct differentiation in treatment. Alternatively,
Collins (2003) has suggested that equality should focus on the aim
of furthering social inclusion.
The multiplicity of potential interpretations of equality in any
given situation has led Westen (1982) to argue that it is nothing but
an empty concept, used principally for rhetorical effect. However,
it seems short-sighted to dismiss the conceptual value of equality in
this way. As D’Amato (1983) has proposed, equality may well gain
meaning only when it is based on an understanding of the sub-
stantive issues affecting the parties in any particular circumstance;
but rather than rendering it an ‘‘empty concept,’’ this simply re-
quires a conceptualization recognizing that a consideration of the
relevant substantive issues in each individual case is always imper-
ative. And although ‘‘substantive equality’’ can be variously inter-
preted, its underlying principle remains constant and inherently
valuable in any interpretation: the objective of remedying unfair
disadvantage. That premise underlies the central proposition of
this article: that laws and policies impacting minority cultural prac-
tices can only be consistent with the aim of substantive social
equality in the context of modern, pluralized society if the process
of developing these laws involves an active endeavor to understand
the meaning of minority practices for those they will affect. This
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way, the nature of any forms of disadvantage that may potentially
result from implementation, and the consequent equality implica-
tions of that disadvantage, can be properly understood.
States that seek to pursue a substantive equality approach to
laws and policies concerning minorities do so in different ways.
Canada has particularly strong antidiscrimination laws and an ac-
tive approach to affirmative action measures for minority groups.11
Special measures are permitted where it is clear that there is a
situation of inequality causing a particular group to be disadvan-
taged but that cannot be reconciled under the existing policy. For
example, quotas for ethnic minority candidates in institutions may
be appropriate when it is clear they are insufficiently represented
as a result of the current selection system. Asserting that a state
should ‘‘re-allow’’ practices such as headscarf-wearing for school-
girls, however, is not equivalent to requesting a form of ‘‘affirma-
tive action’’ as it is not a claim for a temporary measure,12 but for
the indefinite recognition of a distinctive cultural attribute. It is a
claim of indirect discrimination on the basis that the law dispro-
portionately affects rights to freedom of religion and expression,
and more intangibly the cultural identity of a minority group.
In line with its substantive equality agenda, Canada found in
favor of a minority group in a comparable case, in which Sikh
policemen sought a policy amendment from the state exempting
them from the requirement to wear motorcycle helmets so that
they could wear a turban (Kymlicka 1995:96). The comparability of
the two situations is limited, however. In the Canadian case, the
police policy itself was in place to ensure officers’ physical safety,
and there was no indication of a prior objective to restrict any
minority cultural practice; the discrimination inherent in the policy
appeared to be entirely unintentional. The French case is signifi-
cantly different in this respect. The 2004 law was implemented not
only with the direct intention of restricting the headscarf as a sec-
ularist measure, but also on a positive equality ticket, in that the
11 Canada’s stance on this is constitutionally entrenched: Section 15(1) of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) guarantees equality to a broad range of
groups, and Section 15(2)(1) affirms the validity of affirmative action, providing that the
first subsection does not preclude any ‘‘law, program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.’’ This is confirmed by case law; the leading case is Lovelace v.
Ontario 1 S.C.R. 950 (2000), where the Supreme Court of Canada decided that distribution
of gaming profits to registered aboriginal groups and not to unregistered groups was not
discriminatory, because the purpose of the law was to improve the social and economic
conditions of the registered groups.
12 The definition of legitimate special measures in international human rights law
includes the proviso that any such measures ‘‘shall not be continued after the objective for
which they were taken had been achieved’’ (Article 1(4) of the International Covenant for
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1969).
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headscarf was presented as inherently incompatible with the prin-
ciple of gender equality.
Gender Equality and Its Contradictions
An examination of the multiple ways in which the headscarf
issue can be understood in terms of gender equality reveals the
complexity involved in interpreting the equality implications sub-
stantively. Part of the reason for that multiplicity of understandings
is due to the multiplicity of meanings the headscarf has as a gar-
ment for the women who wear it.
The headscarf is referred to as hijab, a term that is used to refer
to the practice of wearing numerous other forms of Islamic dress
and in Islamic scholarship is given the wider connotation of mod-
esty, privacy, and morality. These values are generally considered
by Muslims to be key principles of Islam, and they form the basis of
the religious justification for the dress practices. However, ques-
tions such as the extent to which modesty and privacy are religious
duties, the weight and content of those duties, and the specific
question of whether or not the hijab principle equates with a re-
quirement of Islam that all Muslim women should wear head-
scarves, are disputed. Those who believe that Islam requires
women to cover their hair tend to refer to several verses from the
Qur’an. One is of these is verse 24.31, which reads, ‘‘Enjoin be-
lieving women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to
preserve their chastity; not to display their adornments (except
such as are normally revealed); to draw their veils over their bo-
soms and not to display their finery except to their husbands,’’ and
another is verse 33.59, which reads, ‘‘Prophet, enjoin your wives,
your daughters, and the wives of true believers to draw their veils
close round them. That is more proper, so that they may be rec-
ognised and not be molested’’. Many women who wear the head-
scarf say that they do so on the basis of their reading of the Qur’an
and consider it to be a symbol of modesty, a constant physical re-
minder of that value in the course of their daily life, and an in-
alienable part of their religious identity.
However, many deny that these verses in fact require the head
to be covered, particularly when read in a contemporary setting.
Ashfar (1989:13), for instance, argues that although the headscarf
has developed as a religious tradition on the basis of the Qu’ranic
texts, women should not consider it to be an obligation of Islam, as
the Qu’ranic verses do not stipulate that it must be worn by all
women. Taken as a whole, in her view, they simply require that
women should behave ‘‘modestly,’’ which in itself is a relative term
requiring interpretation. Indeed, there are many other Qu’ranic
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verses that refer to head coverings, each of which is given different,
often disharmonious scholarly interpretations (Ashfar 1998:198–
202).13
Despite the divergence of interpretations, many feminists (from
both Muslim and non-Muslim backgrounds) conclude that the
headscarf is inherently inimical to gender equality, acting as a
marker of women’s inferiority in relation to men. Some who have
been involved directly or indirectly with patriarchal societies in
protest about the abuse and oppression of women view the head-
scarf as a representative element of that struggle. In Iran, for in-
stance, wearing the headscarf in public is a legal obligation under
the Islamic Criminal Code (Art. 139), and to go out bareheaded is
to risk imprisonment. In 1994, Professor Homa Darabi from Teh-
ran’s National University was dismissed from her chair for not
wearing the veil and responded by taking it off in the street, pour-
ing petrol over herself, and setting herself alight. This is clearly an
extreme and localized case, but it demonstrates the danger that the
headscarf can be interpreted by strongly conservative elements of
Islam not merely as a covering for women, but as a structural
separation barring women’s way to the public sphere (Ashfar
1998:210). It is important to recognize, however, that it is incon-
ceivable for a comparable situation to occur in the context of a
European democratic society such as France, in which the head-
scarf is being examined for the purposes of this article. Conversely,
France represents the opposite extreme, as legal restrictions are
imposed to prevent it from being worn, rather than to enforce it.
Looking to the future, some Muslim feminists argue that be-
cause the headscarf has now become a visible symbol that the global
public has become acutely aware of, it will prove to be an important
indicator of the gender relations that will shape the future for Is-
lamic women and could ultimately be the main determinant as to
whether Islamist movements around the world evolve toward in-
tegration with civil societies that uphold individual rights, or to-
ward a countersociety that produces totalitarian tendencies (Göle
1996:140).
Many non-Muslim feminists writing from a Western perspec-
tive argue that headscarves are inevitably damaging for women and
for the cause of gender equality as a whole, even in societies where
they are not a direct catalyst for violence against women or an
element of a fundamentalist regime. ‘‘Radical’’ feminists, such as
MacKinnon, regard the headscarf as one of a multitude of means
developed by men to entrench male domination throughout
society by imposing an inferiority complex on women. As such,
the headscarf is representative of an entire narrative of female
13 Ashfar cites Nazira Zin al-Din’s work on this matter.
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subjugation. Even if women believe they want to wear the head-
scarf, MacKinnon (1983) argues, this is in fact a ‘‘false conscious-
ness,’’ as their self-perception and social roles are forced upon
them and instilled in them by the culture around them.
‘‘Liberal’’ feminists take a more modified stance but still tend to
see the headscarf as a symbol of opposition to a vision of gender
equality wherein women should be treated in parity with men.
They prioritize this objective over claims about the importance of
cultural identity, arguing that the importance of cultural member-
ship for women is overstated. For them, ‘‘traditional culture’’ is
often sentimentalized and perceived as a static phenomenon,
whereas in fact is it more fluid and evolutionary (Yael Tamir, cited
in Okin 1999:52). Rather than prioritizing what seems to be best
for the continuity of a cultural tradition, it is more important to
prioritize what is best for women. They point out that in many
cases where ‘‘culture’’ is invoked as a defense for laws or traditions
that treat women differentially, the proponents of the cultural ar-
gument are nearly always men, rather than women.14
In relation to the specific question of headscarves in schools,
one liberal feminist view is that the school environment should
offer female pupils a means of escape from male domination rather
than mirroring the pattern of paternalistic cultural life experienced
at home. The headscarf can be considered a particularly restrictive
garment in this context, on the basis that schooling is a formative
environment in terms of personal development. This line of argu-
ment maintains that, if girls mark themselves by such a distinctive
article of clothing, this may inhibit their ability to form relation-
ships with others and will ultimately affect their right to education.
Another factor in the equation is the problem that the headscarf is
sometimes worn by girls at school not through their own choice but
due to the demand of conservative religious parents who may
thereby be inhibiting their children’s capacity to integrate into the
mainstream culture in which they are living (Katha Pollitt, cited in
Okin 1999:29–30).
Although many of these anti-headscarf arguments are persua-
sive, all are in some ways problematic. Is the headscarf solely or
invariably a symbol of female submission and inferiority in Islam,
or is its meaning more complex and divergent, particularly in
14 An example is Lovelace v. Canada 1981. In this case, the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) overturned a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court regarding a provision of the
Indian Act, which stated that women (not men) would be struck off the Indian Register if
they married a non-Indian. The Canadian court had decided that the relevant disadvan-
taged group for consideration was the interests of the minority Indian group as a whole,
rather than the women within that group. The HRC disagreed and found the provision to
be discriminatory against women. Clearly, those articulating the interests of that Indian
group had been men, not women.
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contemporary European societies? How far is the form of ‘‘equal-
ity’’ sought by liberal feminists actually representative of the wishes
of all women, and of Islamic women in particular? And are school-
girls who wear the headscarf really ‘‘brainwashed’’ to believe that
they cannot grow up to be the independent women they could
otherwise become in society? As for those girls who choose to wear
the headscarf independently of their parents’ preferences, is it not
patronizing to suggest that they may not be able to form mean-
ingful relationships with other children?
Indeed, in manifestation of the stratified nature of feminist
thought, there are many feminists who argue that the headscarf is
far from inimical to principles of gender equality, and that to por-
tray it as such is to misunderstand and misrepresent it (Azizah Al-
Hibri, cited in Okin 1999:41). Many Muslim feminists consider
Western feminists’ critiques of the headscarf to be culturally es-
sentialist value judgments that demonstrate stereotypical views of
Muslim women as the inferior ‘‘other’’ and fail to appreciate the
diversity of cultural practices within Islam (El Guindi 1999:182). In
her discussions about the matter, Ahmed (1992:246) emphasizes
the problem famously articulated by Said in Orientalism (1979) that
much of Western scholarship on Eastern cultures is produced
within a Western framework and is therefore distorted by cultural
bias and deep-rooted misunderstanding. Some Muslim feminists
associate support for banning the headscarf with colonialist ten-
dencies, citing the French social policy of cultural assimilation and
emphasizing the damage caused to people by attempts to obliterate
their cultural identity through the imposition of prohibitions on
cultural symbols as personal as items of dress.
Although many Muslim women see the headscarf purely as a
religious requirement, there are many other, more nuanced as-
pects of the modern tendency to wear the headscarf. El Guindi has
explored ways in which the headscarf is used to define the rela-
tionship between religious beliefs and values and everyday social
interactions. She claims that ‘‘reserve and restraint in behaviour,
voice and body movement are not restrictions’’ (1999:145). For
example, rather than manifesting a passive submission to the Is-
lamic community, the headscarf can express an active interest in
Islamic scripture, as a gesture to reaffirm a commitment to Islamic
morality and identity within a modern social context (Göle 1996:4).
In a similar vein, when examining the role of the headscarf in
modern Turkey, Özdalga (1998) situates it as part of a larger
struggle of devout women to find a place for themselves after the
disorienting break of continuity created by Atatürk’s secular rev-
olution and its aftershocks.
Alternatively, the headscarf can be used as an enabling device,
in that it allows its wearer to interact in modern society without
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feeling that she is being perceived as a sexual object. However,
other feminists interpret that same point differently; Göle (1996)
asserts that, while the headscarf does indeed have a pragmatic
function of enabling women to take an increasingly active part in
modern society, this is not so much due to their own personal
values as it is to the feeling that women need to conform to a
standard of propriety imposed by their peers, and this paradox-
ically maintains a distinction between private and public based on a
gender-separating view that inevitably props up male hegemony.
But again, the relative importance of these conflicting impacts is
debated; some argue that the headscarf ’s function as a means of
cultural identification is more important for women, in the real
circumstances of their daily lives, than more abstract concerns
about perceptions of gender implications.
Another reason that some women cite for wearing the head-
scarf is to use it as a positively empowering political tool, a means of
demonstrating a reformulation of their social and cultural identity
to include aspects of both the traditional and the modern. Again,
reasons for this depend on the social and geographical context.
Macleod (1993) has conducted empirical research into the seem-
ingly paradoxical phenomenon that modernizing middle-class
women in Egypt with successful careers in office jobs have volun-
tarily begun to wear the headscarf, in contravention of legal re-
strictions imposed by the secular state. She found that most of these
women conceive of it as a new style of political struggle, a tense
subcultural dilemma that involves elements of both resistance and
acquiescence. These women want to express their ambivalence
about working outside the home in an office environment, which
they consider to bring new burdens as well as benefits. They are
concerned that leaving their home and family in this way is eroding
their social status and their traditional identity. This does not mean,
however, that Egyptian women are abandoning their career aspi-
rations and returning to an antiquated self-perception of social
subordination; their views are far more subtle, and women retain
ambition to work freely outside the home. That finding was con-
firmed by Zeinab Radwan (cited in Ahmed 1992), who conducted a
systematic investigation in Egyptian universities where she ques-
tioned both veiled and unveiled students about their values and
future aspirations to see whether a pattern emerged among its
wearers. She found that, although the veiled women were a little
more conservative concerning questions relating to the importance
of women’s education and employment outside the home, re-
sponses were on the whole very similar. Performative modes of
political resistance of this kind have been examined in depth by
Butler (Salih 2004), who argues that members of minority groups
are able to express themselves much more easily and powerfully
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through such symbolic physical acts than they are able to do
through verbal discourse.
In Western European countries such as France, the headscarf
can be politically empowering as a means of positively expressing
dis-alignment or disillusionment with certain aspects of Western-
ized commodity culture, particularly in relation to the sexualization
of women. In fact, an ‘‘antisexualization’’ perspective of this kind is
strikingly aligned to the views of radical feminists such as MacKin-
non and Andrea Dworkin, whose principal aim has been to attack
what they consider to be the oppression of Western women
through sexual portrayals in pornography, and the more wide-
spread pressure on women to advertise their sexual potential as a
commodity. Azizah Al Hibri highlights this connection and points
out the implications of the headscarf debate for cultural essential-
ism in feminist thought, asking, ‘‘Why is it oppressive to wear a
headscarf, but liberating to wear a miniskirt? The crux of the ex-
planation lies in the assumptions each side makes about the women
involved and their ability to make choices’’ (cited in Okin 1999:46).
Other branches of feminism add further colors to the spectrum
of perspectives on the headscarf issue. For instance, the ‘‘cultural
feminist’’ angle is that there are inherent differences between male
and female identities that should be embraced. Gilligan (1982), a
representative of this school, argues that a key difference is that
women are generally more caring and compassionate, and their
sexual life is directly connected to their capacity to bear children in
a way that it is not for men. Consequently, rather than being forced
to conduct themselves like men, women should be able to express
their womanhood in whichever way they experience and under-
stand it. This poses a challenge to liberal feminists’ arguments that
differential treatment for women in the form of dress codes is
necessarily a violation of gender equality principles, since for Mus-
lim women an expression of their womanhood may involve wear-
ing a headscarf.
Finally, feminists with a postmodern approach such as Cornell
(Benhabib et al. 1994) emphasize that the word woman should not
be understood or used as a uniform category, as women every-
where are different, with needs, values, and beliefs that are de-
pendent on their sociocultural context. Therefore the headscarf is
a garment that is used and valued by some women for subjective
reasons upon which it is not for others to cast judgment. As for the
distinction between women and girls, this view would tend to sug-
gest that the experience of girls from Muslim families who choose
or are encouraged to express their religion by wearing headscarves
may well be of equal worth to the experience of girls from non-
Muslim families who may be brought up in other equally distinct
ways; in short, cultural values are primarily relative values.
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If the key test for assessing the substantive equality implications
of a law or policy is whether on balance it creates unfair disadvan-
tage in its particular context, this diverse set of perspectives would
suggest that a headscarf ban in a European country fails that test, as
it restricts the freedom of many women and girls who conceive of it
not just as an affirmation of traditional Islamic values but also as an
embodiment of contemporary feminist concerns about egalitarian-
ism, community, identity, privacy, and justice (El Guindi 1999:145).
Gender Equality versus Freedom of Religion and
Expression?
However, in a situation as complex and multilayered as this
one, the equality formulation does not end there. Those gender
equality issues must also be considered in relation to other human
rights pertinent to the headscarf matter, most prominently the
right to freedom of religion. Seen as one of the most important
rights in liberal democratic society, freedom of religion is recog-
nized in all major civil and political rights instruments. There is an
acknowledged asymmetry within liberal theory created by the con-
flict between freedom of religion and principles of gender equality
that exists in relation to Christianity as well as Islam and other
religions and religious practices (Cass Sunstein, cited in Okin
1999:86). For instance, in no country with sex equality legislation is
the Catholic Church required to accept female priests. The prin-
ciple underlying this apparent disjunction within liberal theory is
that to apply sex discrimination laws to religious institutions would
make it intolerable for some to sustain their existence and would
place a substantial burden on the religious beliefs of individuals.
The key questions pertaining to the headscarf debate are as fol-
lows: first, whether this ‘‘disjunctive’’ approach can be justified in
view of the importance of gender equality; second, how an appro-
priate balance should be struck; and third, whether the approach
to a minority religion can be considered differently from the ap-
proach to the religion of the majority, in order that all religious
groups may be treated in a substantively equal way.
Most liberal feminists are reluctant to reconcile gender equality
and freedom of religion by means of any significant compromise in
the values of gender equality. They tend to be fairly cynical of
religion as a whole in view of its tendency to embody and perpet-
uate perceptions of male superiority through its teachings and
practices, or at least highly critical in their interpretation of par-
ticular religious practices, seeking to draw these practices toward
maximum consistency with values such as gender equality that
characterize contemporary liberal society. Okin takes the view that
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liberal society should allow only the most minimal amount of lee-
way for religious practices in cases that involve nonautonomy for
women, particularly when it comes to children’s education. ‘‘It
seems not at all unreasonable,’’ she argues, ‘‘within the context of a
liberal state that values its citizens’ capacity to make informed de-
cisions . . . to require that children’s education be non-sexist’’
(1999:130). According to this view, the right to gender equality
should take priority, and it provides the state with a compelling
interest in instituting legal reforms that interfere with religious
practices in order that gender equality can be attained. As we have
seen, however, the question of whether wearing a headscarf
equates with nonautonomy, Okin’s prime concern, is far from
straightforward.
Another liberal feminist, Martha Nüssbaum (cited in Okin
1999:106), takes a different approach, conceiving of the right to
freedom of religion as a cornerstone of pluralist liberal democracy.
She proposes that its importance is founded on the dual bases of
the intrinsic value of religion as a reasonable way in which citizens
can pursue their conception of the good within society, and the
concept of respect for persons, within which she includes respect
for their choices to lead traditional religious lives. She is therefore
deeply critical of feminists such as Okin for taking what she sees as
a reductionist approach to religion and viewing it as merely a ‘‘bag
of superstition.’’ She situates their contradictory perspectives with-
in the sphere of liberalism by labeling Okin as a ‘‘constructive lib-
eral,’’ aligned with theorists such as Mill and Raz who see the
fostering of personal autonomy as the principal goal of the state,15
and labeling herself as a ‘‘political liberal,’’ such as Rawls, with a
conception of liberal values not as comprehensive moral values but
as political values that stem from the premise that society will in-
evitably encompass reasonable disagreement and a plurality of
doctrines about the good. This necessitates an ‘‘equality of respect’’
for difference within the religious sphere.
An evaluation of the way that the right to freedom of religion
relates to a particular case must address the issue of whether the
right is being exercised without discrimination as to race, or any
other factor. Given that the historical religious orientation of the
15 Note, however, that Raz also gives special status to religious beliefs, but principally
on the basis that religion forms a central part of a person’s chosen path through life and
therefore is a feature of personal autonomy, rather than focusing as Nüssbaum does on the
existence of plural doctrines of the good as a necessary element of liberal society. See Raz’s
The Morality of Freedom 1986:251. Finnis goes further in his evaluation of the status of
religious belief: he sees religion as a self-evident good, as a means by which people seek an
understanding of their relationship with the forces that created the universe. See Finnis’s
Natural Law and Natural Rights 1980:89–90. Perry argues that a legal system that is de-
tached from fundamental spiritual values loses a lot of its legitimacy. See his Religion and
Politics 1997.
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majority in the relevant context often determines the acceptability of
different objects of value conflict (Modood 1997:16), it is perhaps
not coincidental that an Islamic symbol such as the headscarf should
come under attack in France, a country where the majority popu-
lation and its history are Christian. Of course the relevant French
legislation bans all ‘‘overt’’ religious symbols in schools, including
large Christian crosses, and so purports to be impartial in its impact
and therefore to be politically and legally legitimate. However, the
impact is not equivalent. Wearing the headscarf is believed by many
to be a religious obligation of Islam, whereas wearing a Christian
cross is a matter of choosing to express a religious orientation, and it
is not widely or systematically worn by Christians.16 Of course, this is
also the case for members of other minority religious groups who
consider their own religious garments obligatory, such as skullcaps
for Orthodox Jews and turbans for Sikh men. Indeed, the Sikh
community has also been up in arms about the French law. How-
ever, the North African Muslim immigrant population is so clearly
socioeconomically excluded that it seems clear that the French ban
was intended to affect that particular minority disproportionately.
The secularity of a state adds another dimension to the rights
balancing process and affects the way in which equality is concep-
tualized in relation to issues of religious freedom. In a secular state
such as France, the equal treatment of all according to the secular
norm is clearly more likely to be prioritized over the provision of
any ‘‘special treatment’’ to take into account distinct religious
practices. However, laı̈cité is far from being the only key post-
Revolutionary principle to be promulgated in France; liberté (free-
dom) is also central. It is perhaps in an attempt to strike a com-
promise between the two that France has chosen to draw the line at
imposing a headscarf ban within schools.
The Legitimacy of Minority Group Rights
The central problem with this law is that it affects not only
rights and freedoms in general, but also the rights and freedoms
of a minority group; France’s position is representative of the
16 Kenneth Roth, executive of Human Rights Watch, states:
The impact of a ban on visible religious symbols, even though phrased in
neutral terms, will fall disproportionately on Muslim girls, and thus violate the
antidiscrimination provisions of international human rights law as well as the
right to equal educational opportunity. Indeed, the promotion of under-
standing and tolerance for such differences in values is a key aspect of en-
forcement of the right to education. In practice, the law will leave some
Muslim families no choice but to remove girls from the state educational
system (article posted 27 Feb. 2004, http://www.hrw.org).
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unresolved debate within liberal theory over the place of minority
group rights within the field of human rights, and the way in which
this fits into an overarching vision of social equality.
The principal human rights instruments largely set out rights in
individual terms, and there has long been a widespread liberalist
reluctance to conceive of them in any other way. However, the idea of
equality is a core structural plank in the foundation of human rights,
and it necessarily has a ‘‘group’’ aspect. Nondiscrimination guaran-
tees feature in all such instruments and apply to all rights, and those
guarantees are necessarily set out on the basis of categorized groups,
defined by features such as race, ethnicity, and sex. This presents the
problem of how to reconcile the demands of those categorized
groups with the prevailing liberal democratic state structure, which is
based on the idea that purely individual freedoms are balanced
against the wishes of the elected representatives, who collectively
embody the values of the majority. This problem is particularly acute
in the context of a republican state model such as France, which
emphasizes the collective nature of the nation.
The international approach to the matter of minority rights has
been changeable and has been likened to the swinging of a pen-
dulum (Tom Hadden, cited in Caney & Jones 2001). The initial
move to develop a framework of international human rights law
began between the two World Wars under the auspices of the
League of Nations, and the establishment of a system of protection
for minorities was a primary focus in this period (Thornberry
1991). This system collapsed after 1946, and there was an explicit
decision by the General Assembly to leave group rights off the UN
agenda in favor of individual freedoms. Consequently, Article 27 is
the sole provision in the ICCPR relating to the rights of minorities,
and it refers to the individual members of minority groups, rather
than the groups themselves. This position has recently been
reconsidered, as many in the international community feel that
individual rights have proved insufficient to deal with problems
such as regionalism, the status of indigenous populations, or the
position of immigrants within society. Remedies for this imbalance
have begun to be provided in international law with the creation of
instruments that are designed to protect minority groups.17 The
influence of such developments on interpretations of the principal
human rights instruments, however, is as yet unclear. But on the
whole, the balance of opinion is moving toward an increased rec-
ognition of group rights.
17 Instruments adopted to remedy this situation include the UN Declaration against
Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief in 1981, which contains col-
lective rights provisions; the Council of Europe resolution creating the Charter of the
Rights of Ethnic Minorities in the same year; and the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992.
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The approach of national jurisdictions to group rights has been
mixed, but group-specific rights have been upheld by the courts,
beyond the realms of pluralist Canada. In the case of Wisconsin v.
Yoder (1972) the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the claim of the Amish
community to be able to withdraw their children from school be-
fore the legal age of 16 so as to reduce the likelihood of members
leaving the group in favor of mainstream culture. The individual’s
right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment was
held to outweigh the state’s interests in compelling school atten-
dance beyond the eighth grade. The Court found that the values
and programs of secondary school were in sharp conflict with the
fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion, and
that an additional one or two years of high school would not pro-
duce the benefits of public education cited by the state of Wisconsin
to justify the existing law. The response to this case was mixed.
Communitarians such as Sandel (1998) praised the Court’s
decision, on the basis that freedom of conscience involves the
freedom to choose one’s constitutive ends, that people’s religious
affiliation and cultural background are profoundly constitutive
of who they are and represent their overriding interest, and
therefore that others do not have the ability to stand back and
objectively assess the value of that identity. But many liberal the-
orists have taken an opposite view of the judgment: Kymlicka
(1995:31), for instance, considers Wisconsin v. Yoder to be an exces-
sively extreme group rights case, legitimating an ‘‘internal restric-
tion’’ imposed by the group’s leaders on its members to prevent
their ability to exit the group, and thereby conflicting with indi-
vidual rights.
Kymlicka differentiates this type of case from religious dress
issues such as the headscarf question, which he categorizes as an
example of an ‘‘external protection’’: a less extreme form of group
rights claim that is intended to protect particular groups from the
destabilizing impact of decisions of larger society, and one that does
not conflict radically with individual rights. In the case of Wisconsin
v. Yoder, the children’s right to education is compromised by their
removal from mainstream school in a way it would not be by the
wearing of a headscarf or any other item of dress. Kymlicka refers
to modes of dress as examples of ‘‘polyethnic rights,’’ which are
intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express
pride in their cultural particularity without hampering individual
members’ success in the economic and political institutions of the
dominant society. His justification for this particular type of group
rights claim is founded on a principle that individual members’
autonomy and agency within wider society is preserved, and that
this is the primary constitutive element of human well-being. This
distinguishes his theory from the more communitarian principle
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that one’s immediate culture (including its religious traditions) is
an inherently valuable element of human existence.
In practice, a grey area remains as to where societies should
draw the limits of tolerance for group-specific cultural practices. A
notable example is clitoridectomy, a traditional practice in certain
societies. With respect to this issue, even those who believe that
morality is a relative phenomenon that is dependent on culture
and context would also agree that relativism in modern societies
has limits, and that practices that seem to go so far beyond moral
acceptability for the majority, particularly when they involve phys-
ical harm, should certainly be restricted.18 Wearing the headscarf,
however, does not present moral problems of the same nature; it
does not involve any form of physical harm. Thus it seems a far
more appropriate subject for the exercise of cultural tolerance. Yet
there is a danger that cultural practices of this kind can be attacked
in the same way, by those who are simply uncomfortable with their
foreignness. Hönig (cited in Okin 1999:35) has accused Okin, for
instance, of implying that the slope from veiling to murder (via the
practice of ‘‘honor killing’’) is slippery, and that both represent just
one essential thing: male violence against women, and patriarchal
domination. She points out the danger of a one-sided approach to
questions of cultural difference being taken by decision makers
from the cultural majority and emphasizes the importance of an-
ticipating, considering, and understanding the effects that laws and
policies have on cultural minorities from their perspectives.
The argument that liberal democratic societies tend to select
the minority practices they tolerate in a rational, reasonable way
has been undermined by many legal cases that demonstrate how
easily law can be distorted by legal authorities, manifesting an ir-
rational dislike or fear of a minority group considered to be ‘‘oth-
er,’’ and how legislation is translated through the apparently
neutral and objective mechanism of the law to stigmatize and un-
fairly discriminate against members of a minority group. A gender-
based case illustrates the point particularly clearly in relation to
social tolerance: in Karen Ulane v. Eastern Airlines Inc. (1984), the
claimant, a pilot, was fired because of her decision to change sex
and become a woman. The airline successfully argued that there
was a ‘‘safety issue’’ on the part of passengers and crew, and a
potential for ‘‘danger’’ because of passengers’ reactions to her new
gender. This case reveals an interesting relationship between the
sense of difference and ‘‘otherness,’’ and the perception of safety
and psychological stability, which is pertinent to the headscarf
18 Some dispute that the practice of clitoridectomy should be attacked, comparing it
to Jewish circumcision for boys and questioning why that should be considered more
acceptable (see Sander Gilman, cited in Okin 1999:54).
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debate in light of the connection it is alleged to have with Islamic
fundamentalism. The political and cultural overlap in countries
such as Turkey, where the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is very
much more real than it is in Western Europe. However, the po-
litical rhetoric emanating from the United States in relation to the
so-called war on terror has permeated Western Europe and gen-
erated irrational fears that are directed at Muslim communities
who are largely peaceful, law-abiding European citizens, opposed
to fundamentalist violence. Nevertheless, fundamentalism has
often been cited by politicians and the media as a justification for
dress restrictions (‘‘Bavaria Bans Teacher Headscarves,’’ BBC
News Report, Friday, 12 Nov. 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/europe/4005931.stm [accessed 3 Dec. 2006]).19
The extent to which a society tolerates minority groups’ cul-
tural differences is also significantly affected by class. Intolerance
tends to be most acute when the members of minority groups are
economically subordinated; it is no coincidence that the French
attack on the headscarf commenced at a time when its Muslim
minorities were being relegated without employment to the sub-
urbs. In his exploration of this idea, Walzer (1997:56) points to the
invisible caste system of immigrant groups from poorer countries
in the United States who work as cleaners, dishwashers, and rub-
bish collectors, and who are rarely looked in the eye by members of
the majority. He suggests that the combination of political weak-
ness, poverty, and racial stigma poses enormous problems for the
‘‘regime of toleration’’ that the immigrant society in the United
States is supposed to embody, and he concludes that a system of
affirmative action is always needed reduce the class hierarchies that
infect social tolerance. Masking such problems by laws to suppress
dress codes that visibly manifest minorities’ cultural differences is
surely not the answer.
Those who argue that one of the key problems with giving
Muslim French girls a ‘‘group right’’ to wear the headscarf have
two prongs to their argument: first, that some Muslim schoolgirls
are coerced by their families into wearing the headscarf in school
(so they are not doing it through individual choice), and second
that it then affects these schoolgirls’ equal ability to pursue their
education and develop relationships with their peers. There are
problems with both prongs. First, the right of parents to bring up
and educate their children in the way they believe to be best,
in accordance with their own cultural values, must be respected.
Article 13 of the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and
19 This BBC news report cites statements of Bavarian Culture Minister Monika
Hohlmeier, an advocate of imposing a headscarf ban for German teachers, whose central
justification for the proposal was the threat of fundamentalism.
Wiles 729
Cultural Rights (ICSECR), which provides for the right to educa-
tion, is qualified in Subsection (3) as follows: ‘‘The State Parties to
the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of
parents . . . to ensure the religious and moral education of their
children in conformity with their own convictions.’’20 In any event,
although parental ‘‘coercion’’ is clearly undesirable, it is in practice
rare as the situation is often far more subtle; children tend to nat-
urally adopt their parents’ values and practices. Second, an asser-
tion that the headscarf inevitably causes disadvantage in terms of
social interaction in school and that this affects girls’ right to ed-
ucation is of questionable validity. The headscarf certainly does not
need to affect the ‘‘core’’ of their equal right to education, in terms
of the substantive content of learning gained in the classroom,
where all girls follow the same curriculum; girls with headscarves
are equally able to absorb ideas and learn to think for themselves,
and they are thus enabled make their own choices about their
religion and lifestyle when they reach adulthood. On this analysis,
the disadvantage caused to girls as a minority group by the head-
scarf in terms of their right to personal autonomy and education is
marginal, and it should therefore be tolerated.
The Importance of Cultural Identity
Despite the unwillingness of the French to address the socio-
economic inequalities affecting Muslims, the French law is not
solely an attempt to mask those tensions; it is also a manifestation
of a deep discomfort with the idea that the distinct cultural
identity of Muslims is a legitimate thing for the state to protect,
or even for Muslims themselves to want to protect. Indeed, debates
over the legitimacy of group rights claims inevitably lead to
deeper questions about the importance of the phenomenon of
‘‘cultural identity.’’ What does ‘‘cultural identity’’ really mean
within multicultural society? And, most important for the purposes
of this article, how should it affect the interpretation of equality
in a case involving the characteristic practices of a minority
group?
20 See the Rahin judgment (Leyla Rahin v. Turkey 2005), paras. 134–152, for a discussion
of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR, which provides for the right to education. See also
Article 13(3) of the ICSECR, which provides:
The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their
children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which
conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or
approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of
their children in conformity with their own convictions.
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The classical liberal view is that cultural identity is not important,
as it is peripheral to the teleological moral and rational development of
civilized society that gives meaning to human existence. This perspec-
tive is reflected in the ideas of contemporary liberal rights theorists
such as Talbott (2005), who claims that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is the result of the process of continual moral devel-
opment of the societies who produced it, and that it is founded on
universal and invariable moral principles. Laws and policies that per-
tain to polyethnic recognition for immigrant groups are seen as either
damaging to the development of a universal society, or simply an
unimportant ‘‘symbolic’’ mode of recognition; Ignatieff has described
them as ‘‘narcissism of minor differences’’ (1993:21).
But many other liberal theorists believe that cultural identity is
central to self-identity, to a sense of community belonging (Margalit
& Raz 1990:447). Rawls (1993:222) has proposed that people de-
pend on the history, customs, and conventions of their society and
culture to find their place in the social world they inhabit. Kymlicka
(1995:105) argues that cultural membership provides people with
an intelligible context of choice to call upon in confronting ques-
tions about personal values and projects. Many who dismiss the
importance of cultural identity do so upon the premise that the
‘‘culture’’ referred to tends to be a traditional, inherently static
concept that is both unsuitable and unrealistic in multicultural so-
cieties. However, it is a mistake to characterize it that way; culture is
almost always a fluid entity. It has been described by Tamir (cited in
Okin 1999) as the product of a ‘‘continuous, creative social effort,’’
and as a phenomenon that is ‘‘continually being made and re-
made’’ (Yael Tamir, cited in Okin 1999:72). Elements of tradition
are often fused with elements of modernity in creative and unex-
pected ways, particularly in multicultural society. Culture’s kinetic
nature, however, does not prevent it from being understood as a
tangible entity that matters to people’s sense of self and worth.
Communitarian theorists argue that cultural identity is funda-
mentally important to individual well-being, as an inherent part of
human existence, because of every individual’s need to identify with a
group, and Sandel emphasizes the depth of commitment that most
individuals have to comprehensive culturally derived doctrines that
they learn from their communities (Sandel 1998:189). Taylor et alia
(1992:25) maintain that it is positively harmful for a state to ignore
cultural difference, as nonrecognition or misrecognition can be a
form of oppression of members of minority cultural groups, impris-
oning them in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.
Identity in the modern world is conceived of by postmodern
theorists as multiplicitous, fragmentary, fluid, contingent, and
continuously shifting. Women from immigrant communities are
subject to many different influences that shape their identities.
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These influences are dependent on a range of factors such as the
nature of the society they have come from, the society they are now
living in, and their generation. The various identity-shaping pro-
cesses have been described by Kallen as a combination of ‘‘en-
culturation’’ (learning the ways of one’s own ethnic collectivity
through the transmission of ethnically valued symbols and skills),
which generates ‘‘pull’’ forces into the group, and ‘‘acculturation’’
(learning the ways of larger society by exposure to cultural alter-
natives and to new societal groups), which generates ‘‘push’’ forces
away from the group (Kallen 2003:82). In her story ‘‘How It Feels
to Be Colored Me,’’ Zora Neale Hurston presents a vivid account of
identity from a racial minority perspective, describing her own
sense of self as a ‘‘brown bag of miscellany propped up against a
wall’’ (Hurston 1979:155). Individual identity, then, should not be
seen as a unitary essence, but as a ‘‘multiple consciousness’’ con-
structed from fragments of experience (Harris 1990:584).
The interaction of such multifaceted identities is inevitable in
the context of complex, multicultural societies. The outward man-
ifestation of these identities through visibly different modes of
dress is similarly inevitable. Cultural symbolism is not just a pe-
ripheral concern for minorities; the headscarf controversy in
France makes this only too clear. To trivialize the importance of
societal recognition of such symbols seems misguided; conversely,
societal recognition and acceptance indicate that people belonging
to that minority group are perceived by wider society to be of equal
value despite their cultural differences (Parekh 1990:96–7).
Conclusion
In the light of the ever increasing cultural pluralism of modern
societies, normative assumptions of objective neutrality in legal
discourse are constantly being unpeeled. Traditional, formal con-
ceptions of equality are being rejected by contemporary scholar-
ship in favor of a substantive equality that seeks to redress unfair
disadvantage. Cultural identity is now recognized to be of foun-
dational importance to the human experience, particularly for mi-
nority groups. To deliberately suppress aspects of minorities’
cultural identity through restrictive laws is likely to constitute
unfair discrimination and as a result to exacerbate social tensions.
A renewed awareness of the need to incorporate cultural diversity
into legal thinking is now permeating interpretations of human
rights instruments, founded as they are on the core idea of equal-
ity; it is becoming widely accepted that acknowledging the diversity
of human existence does not need to compromise the commonality
of values expressed in human rights instruments, but should in fact
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increase their meaning. If human rights and equality are inter-
preted with greater sensitivity to cultural identity, this will prevent
anachronistic laws based on formal equality from being invoked as
a justification to suppress cultural differences and will act as a
catalyst for legal changes that enable societies to develop more
organically and harmoniously.
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